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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STEVEN U. HEALEY, 
Plaintif {-Respondent, 
-vs-
EARL N. DORIUS, Director, 
Driver License Division, 
State of Utah, J 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
13000 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEl\1ENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This appeal concerns the legality of a driver's li-
cense revocation by the appellant under Utah's Implied 
Consent Law, Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6-44.10 (1953), as 
amended. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On l\Iarch 13, 1972, the appellant revoked respon-
<lent' s driver's license for a period of one year effective 
February 9, 1972, for respondent's alleged failure to 
submit to a sobriety test under Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44.10 ( 1953}, as amended. Pursuant to the pro-
visions of the Act, respondent sought a trial de novo 
2 
in the District Court in and for Salt Lake County for 
a determination of whether respondent's driver's Ii- ! 
cense was subject to revocation under the circumstances. 
The case was heard before the IIonornble Ernest F. 
Baldwin, .Tr., on l\Iay 2, l!J7~ .. Judge lfaldwin found 
that "petitioner did in fact constructively refuse to take 
a chemical test as required hy 41-6-44'.lO(c), U.C.A. 
( 1953) but that such refusal was not without reason-
able cause" . . . ( R. 6). There are no findings of fact 
or conclusions of law of record in the proceeding and 
no order other than that signed by Judge Baldwin on 
June 29, 1972 (R. 6). Basecl on the above order, Judge 
Baldwin ordered the respondent's license restored to him 
by setting aside the revocation of appellant dated l\farch ' 
13, 1972. 
RELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a re,·ersal of the lower court's 
order restoring the respondent's driver's license and 
. seeks an order affirming the appellant's order of revo-
cation. 
STATEl\IEN'T OF' FACTS 
On December 28, 1971, at approximately 2:07 a.m., 
Officer Linden J. Roherts, a l\Iurray City Police Of-
ficer, stopped and arrested the respondent, Steven U. 
IIealey (Tr. 9) and advised the respondent of his rights 
under the Implied Consent Law (Tr. 10). The re-
spondent said he would like to consult with his attorney 
a 
(Tr. 10) and the officer and respondent went to the 
:Murray City Police Station. Respondent called his at-
torney, .l\Ir. 'i\T endell P. Ables, Esq., in the presence of 
Officer Roberts and Officer Gary Reid (Tr. 2, 3, 15, 
Hi) who was prepared to administer the "breathalyzer" 
test to respondent. (Tr. 2, IO) Officer Roberts reported 
that the respondent was advised by his attorney not to 
take the test unless he (the attorney for respondent) 
was present at the time he was taking the test at the 
station. (Tr. 12) Officer Roberts told the respondent 
that it was his understanding that it was not necessary 
for his attorney to be present, just that he he advised 
to either take the test or not take the test and that he 
should call his attorney back. The respondent called 
l\lr. Ables again at which time Officer Roberts talked 
to Mr. Ables and l\lr. Ables said to Officer Roberts, 
"'\V ell, I'm advising him not to take it unless I'm 
present.' " Ile says, "'I'm not advising him not to take 
the test, no!' " I-le says, " 'But I'm just saying, 'Don't 
... he ... 'I don't want him to take that test unless I'm 
present there.' " (Tr. 13). This was approximately one 
hour since arrest. (Tr. 13) Respondent's attorney said 
it wou]d take him one hour to get to the station due to 
personal reasons (Tr. 13). Officer Roberts advised re-
spondent and respondent's attorney that by the time 
another hour went by his evidence of intoxication would 
have evaporated or diminished (Tr. 13). There was 
dispute in the record as to whether the attorney wanted 
to he there when the test was taken (Tr. 13) or just to 
talk to the respondent personally before taking any test 
(Tr. 16, 17, 18, 22, 23). The refusal was filed out at 
approximately 3:20 a.m., (Tr. 14), an hour and thirteen 
minutes approximately from time of arrest. l\1r. Ables 
did not talk to the respondent thereafter nor did he come 
to the l\lurray City Police Station, nor did respondent 
ask to call any other attorney. 
On cross-examination, Officer Roberts stated that 
the respondent said, " 'I'm not ref using to take the test, 
because I'll take the test if my attorney's present.'" 
(Tr. 19, 22) 
l\Ir. Ables then testified that he would not advise 
his client on confidential matters over the phone (Tr. 
24) and he wanted to talk to him personally. (Tr. 3) 
The respondent's attorney's contention is "that I 
have a right to consult with him (respondent) in per-
son . . . and not go through a police switchboard on 
matters that are privileged and confidential .... " (Tr. 
3) 
Absent findings of record, the appellant looks to 
the transcript for the findings of the lower court. One 
such (Tr. 30) is whether, "when a ma11 is under arrest 
and he consults his attorney, and that atton1ey tells him, 
"Don't take the test until I get there", is that "reason-
able cause" to refuse to take it until he gets there? An-
other is what is meant by "reasonable cause"? (Tr. 31), 
to refuse. A third contention of the Court was that the 
appellant has the burden of proving that respondent 
"did not have a reasonable cause to submit to the test." 
(Tr. 32). 
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A fourth, that there is a distinguishable shade of 
interpretation between "a reasonable cause not to sub-
mit" and a "reasonahle cause to follow counsel's ad-
vise." The court concludes (Tr. 34) that "he (re-
sponclent) did not submit to the test, but that his refusal 
to submit, or his failure to submit was based upon ad-
vice of counsel, and, therefore, that he had reasonable 
cause not to submit. ... " (Tr. 34). 
The court then reiterates (Tr. 35): 
THE COURT: I will find that he did not sub-
mit to the test, and he did not submit upon advice of 
counsel, and would not su bruit until counsel a-rrived, 
anrl counsel indicated counsel would not arrive for one 
hour, and only that, his statements that he would not 
s11hrnit until counsel was there-it was just and reason-
able cause. 
I must take the implication, if you have a right to 
counsel. that it's only reasonable that you will follow 
counsel's advice .... 
THE COURT: As I say, I see nothing wrong 
with anything in the Officer's conduct, and
1 
I have to 
say this man didn't act unreasonably, because he was toUl 
what to do." (Emphasis ours.) 
Respondent was fully aware that his refusal to sub-
mit to one of the tests could result in the revocation of 
his license for one year. Cl'r. 10)~ (Tr. 14, 20}. Re-
spondent's attorney was likewise aware of this fact. 
(T~ 14,20,29,23). 
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BACKGROUND 
This is no doubt in the hope of curbing the tre-
menclous increases in drunken driving and to help over-
come many of the evidentiary difficulties in provi11g 
sueh intoxication, the legislatures in Utah and several 
other states have enacted implied consent laws requir-
ing persons to ~ubmit to breath, blood, urine or saliva 
tests or Jose their license for refusing to do so. 62A 
Conf'>olidated Laws of New York, Article 31 § 1194; 7 
North Dakota Century Code :39-20 Chemical Test for 
Intoxication: Implied Consent; Utah Code Annotated 
41-6-44.10. These laws have been discussed rather wide-
ly in Law Review articles throughout the country and 
in the American Law Heports. 18 Albanq L.Rev. 203; 
17 Albany L.Rev. 258; ~31 l\Iich. L.Rev. 1195; 44 l\Iinn 
L.Rev. 673; 35 Tex. L.Rev. 813; 88 A.L.R.2d 1064. 
As the laws presently stand, two requisites are es· 
sential to validify the revocation of a license. These are: 
( 1) The requirement of an appropriate invita· 
· tion to take the test, including 
( 2) the prerequisite :in-est, 
(b) sufficient p1·obable cause to consider the in· 
vitee to he intoxicated, and 
( c) an appropriate opportunity to select the test 
to be applied if, as in Utah, such privilege is available; 
and 
( 2) the refusal, either expressed or implied, must 
be communicated to, or reasonably presumed by, the in· 
7 
viting officer. (See Ringwood vs. State, 8 U.2d 287, 
333 P.2d 943 (Utah 1959)) See also: Timm v. State, 
no N.W.2d 359, (N.D. 1961). 
The relevant wording of Section 41-6-44.10, 
U.C.A., is as follows: 
(a) Any person operating a motor ve-
hicle in this state shall be deemed to have given 
his consent to a chemical test of his breath or 
blood for the purpose of determining the alco-
holic content of his blood, provided that such 
test is administered at the dir~ction of a peace 
officer having reasonable grounds to believe · 
such person to have been driving in an intoxi-
cated condition. The arresting officer shall de-
termine within reason which of the afore said 
tests shall be administered . . . ( c) If such 
person has been placed under arrest and has 
thereafter been requested to submit to any one 
of the chemical tests, provided for in subsec-
tions (a) or ( b) of this section and ref uses to 
submit to such chemical test, the test shall not 
be given and the arresting officer shall advise 
the person of his rights under this section. 
8 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I 
THE PEACE OFFICER IN TIIE IN-
STANT CASE Ali'TER ARRESTING THE 
RESPONDENT AND GIVING IIIl\1 HIS AP-
PROI~HJATE 'VARNINGS HAD REASON-
A'BLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THE RE-
SPONDENT "rAs INTOXICATED. 
According to the record, Officer Linden J. Roberts 
placed respondent in the patrol car and under arrest and 
then warned respondent of his rights. As indicated in 
the testimony of Officer Roberts and counsel for re-
spondent stipulated, there was reasonable cause for ar-
rest, the respondent drove his car at an extremely high 
rate of speed, sidewashed down the road, and straddled 
the white line down the middle of the road. (Tr. 9) 
POINT II 
TIIE RESPONDENT 'VAS G I V E N 
AJ\lPLE. OPPORTUNITY TO SUJJl\ll'f TO 
HIS CIIOICE OF TlIE OFFERED SOBRIETY 
TESTS. 
The record contains invitations from Officer 
Roberts for the respondent to submit to one of the tests. 
The respondent and his counsel knew that his refusal 
could, according to the statutory language read to him, 
result in the revocation of his license on that basis alone 
9 
(Tr. 14). The refusal to submit to a sobriety test was 
sufficient in and of itself to justify revocation. In 
Prucha v. Department of "JJf otor V chicles, 172 N eh. 
415, 110 N.\V. 2d 75 (1961) the court held that the re-
vocation was not arbitrary and capricious because of the 
fact than an acquittal of a criminal charge had no bear-
ing on the provisions of the law separate and distinct 
from criminal statutes. Prucha v. Dept. of "IJ;Jotor Ve· 
hicles, supra; also Combes v. Kelly, 2 l\Iisc. 2d 591, 152 
N. Y.S. 2d 943 ( 1956); Anderson v. Macduff, 208 :Misc. 
271, 143 N.Y.S. 2d 257 (1955). 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT'S REFUSAL TO DECIDE 
\VHETIIER OR NOT TO SUBMIT TO A RE-
QUIRED CHE~IICAL TEST UNDER U.C.A. 
41-G-44.10 AS Al\IENDED UNTIL A PERSONAL 
CONFEUENCE \VITII ATTORNEY IS NOT 
"REASON ABLE CAUSE" NOT TO SUBl\IIT, 
IF Tll\IE OF PERSONAL CONFERENCE IS 
SO FAR REl\IOVED AS TO RENDER POTEN-
TIALLY OBTAINABLE TEST RESULTS 
l\IEANINGLESS. 
A main question for review by this court is: Is 
reasonably following advice of attorney, (whether reas-
onable or unreasonable) reasonable cause to refuse to 
submit to a sobriety test, and therefore sufficient to 
excuse the taking of said test? 
IO 
There can be no dispute of facts that respondent 
did ref use to decide to take the sobriety test until his 
attorney could personally come to the :Murray City 
Police Station and talk to him. There is likewise no 
dispute that the respondent talked to his attorney twice 
from the station on the phone, and consulted with him 
and that by the time the attorney could get to the sta-
tion (by his estimate) two hours plus from the time of 
arrest would have elapsed, which time, the officer con-
sidered to be too late in time for the breathalyzer test. 
There was no evidence at trial to refute the officer's 
opinion that any results then obtained would essentially 
be useless. 
The advise of respondent's attorney was not to take 
the test or do anything until he (the attorney) got there. 
The respondent follmved this advice. 
Clearly it is apparent that one hope of delay or 
waiting can he that a delay of test will show a lessor 
alcoholic content in the blood. There is some testimony 
that that was not a factor. 
It is too broad an extension of "following advice 
of his attorney" to say that he reasonably does whatever 
his attorney tells him to do (whether said advice he good 
or bad or correct or incorrect) under the statutes or the 
law that that is "reasonable" and is not, therefore, n 
"refusal to submit to a chemical test" ... without a 
reasonable cause. . . " 
Such reasoning would make mockery of the very 
purpose of the Im plied Consent Law and would give 
11 
such party arrestetl a reason not to submit in every case 
and in a sense, ther.ef ore, "put the blame on l\iame, 
Boys" (i.e. the arrested parties' attorney). An attorney 
then could, with impunity, advise clients in similar cir-
cumstances not to take the required test until the attor-
ney comes to the jail whether he, in fact, did OT' not so 
come; which then means the officers would have to, in 
each case, wait before hooking procedures for unusual 
periods of time. This would completely upset their work 
schedules, they not knowing for sure whether an at-
torney will or will not come-all the while any measur· 
able quantitati,·e test and its use or validity deminishing 
to the point of non-value. 
A driver on the highways of Utah is presumed to 
know the law. The statutes, called the "Implied Con-
sent Law", puts the duty on the arresting officer to 
advise the party arrested of his rights. For one lawfully 
arrested (and here this is not an allegation to the con-
trary) who thereafter refuses the chemical test or tests, 
after an explanation of the consequences of such re-
fusal; the party so arrested must determine whether to 
take the test and risk evidence that could result in a 
criminal com·iction or to refrain from taking the test 
as required of all such drivers on our highways and risk 
losing his privilege to drive an automobile for one year. 
This must all be achieved within a "reasonable" time, 
or without unduly delaying the officers in other duties 
to be performed. The other exception by statute would 
be that said arrested party did not have some "reason-
able cause" for refusing to submit to the test or tests. 
12 
This court can as readily determine the existence of a 
"reasonable cause" not to submit from the evidence as· 
could the trial court. 
Appellant contends that the present ruling of the 
trial court is in error in that, for the respondent to reas-
onably follow his attorney's advice and not submit to 
the test within a reasonahle time (not controverted at 
trial) was not a valicl excuse of failure to submit to the 
test for a reasonable cause. Appellant feels the trial 
court, in postulating the abm·e as excusable conduct for 
respondent not to s11l1111it, is attempting to draw some 
distinction wihout a difference as relates to following 
his attorney's advice. This, in every case, carried to its 
logical conclusion, could make the villain of the attor· 
ney, not the one arrested, and the one with the duty of 
decision, rather than respondent, and the results that 
flow from that decision could he totally opposite from 
the purpose intended by the legislature. 
POINT IV 
AS A :MATTER OF LA,V, A SOBRIETY 
TEST SJ-IOULD BE HELD AVAILABLE 
ONLY SO LONG AS THE RESULTS THERE· 
FROl\I WOULD HA VE SOl\IE PROBATIV}~ 
VALUE. 
The statute does not catagorically state that an 
arresting officer shall of fer a sobriety test once and if 
refused, then said refusal, regardless of place or time 
18 
lapse is forever binding. In fact, custom and procedure 
of almost all peace o_f ficers (and certainly in the in-
stant case) is that said Implied consent rights, as well as 
the invitation to take a sobriety test, are covered at the 
time of arrest and at the place of proposed testing, and 
at the latter place, often several times. 
The statute does state, however, that the arresting 
officer should be respectfull of the rights of the ac-
cused, and if the one arrested ref uses, the test shall not 
be given. Often it is the case that the arrested party re-
fuses at the scene of arrest and then at the place of pro-
posed testing, or booking into jail, after consulting legal 
counsel, the person changes his mind and agrees to sub-
mit to a chemical test. 
The arrested party certainly should have the right 
to reconsider, to change his mind, so long as, but 
0111,lJ ,'JO long as the results from the proposed test, which-
ever it he, are still of some probative value. The Hunter 
case says a ·:reasonable time (Hunter vs. Dorius, 23 
Ut.2d 122). \Vhat that reasonable time is may vary 
from case to case, conditioned on facts such as: time of 
arrest or accident, time of consumption of last alcoholic 
beverage, time of last meal, whether blood test is pro-
posed, breath test in proposed or a urine test, as the case 
may he. 
The State has a valid interest as well as the indi-
vidual arrested in an objective test of the level of alco-
hol in a drivers bloodstream. This is true for protecting 
the rights of the arrested driver, as well as for the bet-
14t 
terment of law enforcement. The State makes these 
tests available to exo11erate as well as to implicate, and 
it is in the interest of hoth sides to such human drama 
to make the test available so long as the results will have 
probative value. JloweYer, the time comes when suffi-
cient periods have elapsed from arrest to potential test-
ing that the obtainable results are really of no measur-
able quantity and, therefore, of no value. 
Whether of blood or breath or urine, that time, 
unless controverted, is best established by the peace of-
ficer, technician or doctor that is qualified and is going 
to administer the test. 
Certainly, from the facts of this case, the peace of-
ficer felt two hours was unreasonable, he communicated 
that fact to both l\Ir. liealey and his attorney on two 
occasions relatively close together. They did not choose 
to do other than wait and did not, at the time of triaJ, 
put forth any evidence that Officer Roberts was wrong 
in his value judgment as to lapsed time working the 
· potential test virtually meaningless. 
POINT V 
UESPONDE~T'S ACTIONS CONSTITUT-
ED A HEFUSAL UNDER U.C.A. 41-6-11.10 AND 
OFFICER ROUERTS \VAS JUSTIFIED IN 
CONCLUDING THAT THE REFUSAL TO 
SUBl\IIT TO CHEl\lICAL TEST (EXHIBIT 
D-1) \VAS COl\iPLETED. 
15 
The Utah cases relating directly to revocation of a 
driver's license for failure to submit to a test under the 
statute are only these: Bean v. State, 12 Ut. 2d 76, 362, 
P.:M ( l!}(il); Ringn:ood v. State, 8 Ut.2d 287, 333 P.2d 
(rn:rn); lluntcr v. Dnriu.~, 23 Ut. 2d 122, 458 P.2d 877. 
The first two of these cases invalidate the revocation be-
cause the officer failed to give the accused his choice of 
which test of those offered under the statute he would 
take. The JI untrr case is distinguishable because the 
respondent was clearly given his choice and in the in-
stant case respondent was also given his choice. (Tr. 11). 
Severa] other courts have considered what action 
is sufficient to constitue a "refusal" under the law. Of 
course, this is primarily a factual consideration. How-
ever, in the instant case the facts indicate that the re-
spondent was first asked to submit to a chemical test 
while in the patrol car (Tr. 10). The time of such 
stated in the record was some time after 2 :07 a.m. and 
he fore 3 :00 a.m. The latter of which times was approx-
imately the time they were at the .Murray City Police 
Station, talking to respondent's attorney. The invita-
tion continued open from 2 :04 a.m., until after the re· 
spondent contacted his attorney there and communicated 
his advised refusal not to do anything until his attorney 
got there to Officer Roberts. At this point, the refusal 
was completed according to the facts and Officer 
Roberts was justified at that point to draft the report 
of "refusal to submit to a chemical test" form. How-
ever, Officer Roberts still allowed respondent to decide 
for himself by inviting him to again submit to the test. 
16 
At 3 :20 a.m., one hour and 13 minutes after the arrest 
' 
the refusal form was completed. 
Courts have considered that an implied refusal is 
sufficient. Calciano v. llults, 13 App. Div.2d 534', 213 
N.Y.S. 2d 500 (1961); Clancll v. Kelly, 7 App. Div.2d 
820, 180 N.Y.S. 2d 923 (1958). The instant case is not 
rested on solely the implication. The record clearly re-
Vf'als the communication of a continued refusal for one 
hour 13 minutes after the arrest occurred. There comes 
a time when the utility of such a sobriety test would 
become marginal. It should be apparent that the law en-
forcement officials should not be required to heg and 
plead with a reluctant defendant for an unreasonable 
length of time. The rights of an accused are hetter pro-
tected by requiring the accused to make his own decision 
and not he coerced or pressured by law enforcement of-
ficials. The enforcement officials should not have their 
time burdened by such potential unreasonable delays 
before testing would lrnve occurre<l. The officer's judg-
. ment was that it would he of little or no value in one 
more hour (two hours from arrest). 
In Ta,71lor 't'. Kcll,11. 5 App. Div.2d mn, 171 N.Y.S. 
2d 909 ( 1958) the court stated that there was clear and 
direct proof of the licensee's refusal to take the blood 
test. The arresting officer and arraigning justice had 
both testified of the petitioner's refusal to submit to 
one of the sobriety tests offered. The instant case of-
fers similar evidence from the arresting officer, plus 
a confirmation of the refusal to decide or submit to the 
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test hy the officer by the respondent until such time 
had elapsed as to make this particular test meaningless. 
The claim that no refusal was communicated to an 
officer is primarily a factual consideration that has 
usually been received by courts with skepticism and most 
often reflected on the basis of the facts. 
POINT VI 
THE HUNTER V. DOllIUS CASE DOES 
NOT CONTROL AS RELATES TO THE TIME 
LAPSE, TYPE OF SOI~RIETY TEST IN-
VOLVED, OR RIGHT Olj' COUNSEL IN CIVIL 
ASPECT UNDER Tl-IE 11\iPLIED CONSENT 
LA,V. 
Counsel for respondent says Hunter and the time 
frame of llunter categorically apply, yet that case in-
volved a blood test, not breath, and involved a consent 
subsequent to refusal, followed by an arbitrary refusal 
to test by the officer with no evidence apparently that 
a blood test at that point would have been valueless. 
It is altogether different in the case before us. The 
arrested party would not say whether he would submit 
until he talked to his attorney. He did talk to his attor-
ney, not only once, but twice. The officer also talked to 
the attorney told him he knew of no statute or pro-
cedure that made it a matter of law or right for the at-
torney to be present when the arrested party was tested. 
He opinioned, when he found on inquiry that another 
hour would lapse before the attorney could be at the 
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l\Iurray Police Station, that was too long for testing and 
that the attorney should advise his client now. I-le de-· 
clined to do so. The respondent declined to submit until 
his attorney was there. This is clearly a refusal under the 
best interpretation of the facts of the case here; with 
absolutely no showing b~· respondent that the breatha-
lYzer lest results would still be of value in an hour be-
yond a :30 a.m. 
The Hunter case (Hunter v. Doriu.y) 23 Utah 2d 
122, should not be expanded unreasonably to cover cases 
where the arrested party either eannot find his attorney; 
or the arrested party voluntarily gives up trying to 
contact an a ttomey; or as in this case, contacts his at-
torney hut suspends a decision he (Emphasis ours) must 
necessarily make, within a reasonable time, until he can 
see his attorney, which time may well be so far removed 
from time of arrest as to invalidate any results then 
obtainable by chemical test. 
This case is distinguishable from the II untcr case 
. in that the attorney for Dr. Hunter requested the offi-
cer to give a blood test (specified) and it was apparent· 
ly still available, there was no apparent evidence that 
such blood test results would not be of some value, hut 
the test was refused because, apparently, at that point 
the officer involved ·was somehow "irked" at the ar-
rested party, and there was an "air" of arbitrariness, 
shortness, etc., about the encounter at that point. 
In the case at bar, the arrested party was amply 
and numerously advised of his rights; he consulted 
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counsel and followed counsel's advice and at that 
moment both counsel and respondent were on notice 
that respondent's failure then to decide on taking a 
Breathalyzer (Emphasis added) was, in the officer's 
opinion, a refusal because any results from a test pos-
sible after counsel could get to the station would be of 
little or no value at all; and there was no evidence at 
trial to refute this opinion. (Further, there was no real 
assurance of going forward with the test after the ad-
ditional hours wait). The officer was not arbitrary, out 
of sorts, or impolite to the respondent, in fact, he in-
sisted that they call ~Ir. Ables back a second time so 
both woulrl clearly understand the respondent's right 
and his (the respondent's) duty of decision since this 
is a civil matter. 
In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court 
in the hearing de nm·o, apparently is bottomed on the 
premise that respondent had a right (Emphasis sup-
plied) to counsel before deciding whether he would or 
would not take the test. That right exists under the 
"Miranda"1 case, where the actions are criminal in 
nature. There is serious doubt in many jurisdictions 
that such a right to counsel exists in the civil aspects of 
the Implied Consent Law where an arrested party must 
decide whether or not to submit to a type of sobriety 
test. illills v. Bridges, 471 P.2d 66, 93 Idaho 679; I.S. 
§ 4!:>-352.; Garcia v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 456, 
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 
694, 10 A.L.R.3d 97'1 (1966). 
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P.2d 85.; Rust l'.'. Dil'.'ision of 1llotor V chicles, et al., 
1971, 267 C.A.2d 54;'5, 73 Cal. Rptr. 366.; Stratilws v. · 
Department of ltlotor Vehicles, (1968) 477 P.2d 237; 
People v. Brown, 485 P.2d 500; Johnson v. Department 
of iJlotor Vehicles, 48;5 P.2d 12.58 (Oregon 1971); 
Campbell v. Superior Court in rmd For lllaricopa Coun· 
t,y, 479 P.2d 685, 106 Ariz. 542; Goodman v. Orr, 1971, 
97 Cal. Rptr. 226, 19 CA ard 845. 
A recent Colorado case has held that Implied con-
sent statute is not unconstitutional on grounds that it 
violates right to travel upon state highways, or that it 
constitute<; violation of due process by compelling citizen 
to choose either his right to refuse to surrender evidence 
that would help to convict him or his right to retain li-
cense to drive or by creating crime of refusing to con-
sent to blood test punishable by forfeiture of right to 
drive whlle denying fundamental rights of person 
charged with criminal offense, or that it enforces war-
rantless and unreasonable searches and seizures, or that 
. it sanctions invasion of right of privacy or privilege 
against self-incrimination. Const. art. 2, §§ 3, 7; 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 4, 9; 1967 Perm.Supp., 
C.R.S., section 13-5-30 (3) et seq. People v. Brown, 485 
P.2d 500. 
California has numerous cases on the specific ques-
tion of rights to counsel deciding such a right does not 
exist as to Implied consent, this before they amended 
their statutes in 1970, and codified that fact (see 
sentence three, Section No. 13353 paragraph (a), Cal· 
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ifornia :Motor Vehicle Code and amended, Chapter 1103, 
statutes 1970. Effective November 2, 1970. 
The Implied Consent Law of California (prior to 
amendment) , Idaho and Oregon all have provisions 
similar to the language of Utah Section 41-6-44.10, 
U .C.A. 1953, as amended, section (a). In several cases 
before the courts of last impression the decisions are 
unanimous that the right to counsel before a decision to 
submit does not exist on the civil aspect. (See previous-
ly cited cases.) 
The only varience appellant could find to this ruling 
(which non-the-less pronounced the validity of such a 
rule) , was in the Rust case (see Ru,st v. Division of 
Motor V chicles, et al., 1971, 267 C.A.2d 545, 73 
Cal.Rptr. 366) which held that while "::\Iiranda'' rights 
do not apply to tlw Implied Consent Law, there may be 
a factual issue that the officer did not make it clear to 
the arrested party as to the differenciation between 
criminal and civil rights and if that results in confusion 
to the arrested party and that is not cleared up by the 
officer, then there may be a question as to the arrested 
party's refusal to submit. 
An Oregon case on rehearing on the question of 
presence of his atton1ey held that the Driver's refusal to 
take a breathalyzer test without having his attorney 
present was a refusal to take the test under the Implied 
Consent Law, and justified suspension of his Drivers 
License. (See Stratiko,fl v. Department of IJtl otor Ye• 
hicles, (1968) 477 P.2d 237, adheared to and Supple-
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mental 478 P.2d ().54; also Jol111.wn ti. Department of 
)..llotor Vehicles. ct al., 485 P.2d 1258.) (See also IJiills · 
t 1• Bridges, 471 P.2d G6, !.>3 Idaho 679; Ent 'l'. Depart-
ment of 1llotor V chicles. 2G5 A.C.A. 1073, 71 Cal.Hptr. 
726; Finley 1. 1• Orr, 2()2 .A.C.A. 711, 69 Cal.Rptr. 137. 
ln the Ent and Finley cases the refusals were like-
wise npheld. The language in another recent California 
case is supportive, (see Funl..: 'l'. Department of 11/otor 
Vehicles, 1 Cal.A pp.3rd 449, 18 Cal.H ptr. 
The llnnter case ,'fopra, states the plaintiff there-
in "still had a reasonable time in which to make up his 
mind and to seek legal counsel." This was concluded 
on that set of facts after counsel for the defendant 
conceded that "the plaintiff had a right to consult legal 
counsel before making a decision to take or decline the 
test." (see lfuntcr 'l'. Darius, 2 Utah 2d 124, line 16.) 
Such a right \vas not a contested issue of the Ilunter 
case, it was conceded by defendant ancl not disturbed on 
review by this llonorahle Court as the court felt the 
· lower court ruling was supported by the evidence. 
Fundamental to the issues of this case and review 
thereof is the question of such a right to counsel, civil 
right, under the Implied Consent Law, and the further 
question of what, under these facts, was a reasonable 
time for decision making and testing by respondent. 
Appellant respectfully submits that such an abso-
lute right to counsel does not exist under the Implied 
Consent Law. 
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POINT VII 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT RE-
QU lRING THE REVOCATION OF THE RE-
SPONDENT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE TO RE-
MAIN VALID UNDER THE PRESENT 
FACTS. 
\Ve submit that the Judge in the trial court erred 
m not requiring the revocation to remain valid under 
the circumstances. 
The record reveals that, though the respondent al-
lt>ges he did not ref use the tests, (only refused to do 
anything until his attorney arrived) the court agreed 
that the respondent said to Officer Roberts he would 
not take the test because l\lr. Ables, the attorney con-
tacted, told him not to do so, unless he, :Mr. Ables, were 
there. (Conflict of course in testimony as to whether 
there at the police station to "advise" or be present as a 
matter of right "for the test"). With such an admission 
in the record, and finding by the court, the court erred 
in demanding the license to be returned. Section 41-6-
44.10, U.C.A., requires: 
If such a person is placed under arrest and has 
thereafter been requested to submit to any one 
of the above chemical tests, and refuses to sub-
mit to such chemical tests, the test shall not be 
given and the arresting officer shall advise the 
person of his rights under this section. 
'fhis is a civil statute not criminal. 
24 
The statute does not require the officer to invite 
the accused to take the test more than once. In the in- · 
stant case, Officer Hoherts extended himself on two 
occasions to allow the respondent to submit to the test 
and the lower court erred in not allowing the refusal to 
stand and the revocation to be complete. 
A case directly on point as to the facts of this case 
is the Johnson case, supra decided June 17, 1971, where 
the attorney advised taking a hreathalyzer when he got 
there. The Court said that any erroneous impression 
upon which petitioner relied was created by his counsel, 
not the police and the court reversed the trial court. 
Johnson v. Department of IJ[ otor V chicles of the State 
of Oregon, Appellant, 485 P.2d 1285. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant respectfully submits that based upon 
a review of the uncontroverted facts, the trial court 
erred in refusing to allow the revocation of the respon· 
dent's driver's license to remain binding. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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